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IRAN AND THE SHIA OF IRAQ
The rise of Shia influence in Iraqi politics has caused suspicion among (predomi- 
nantly Sunni) Arab leaders and Western analysts alike. Questions arose how stron- 
gly Iran will be able to influence Iraqi affairs. Views on Tehran’s influence are 
divided: some point out that the Shia of Iraq are so different from the Iranian that 
Tehran wields only a limited power in Iraq; in this case, they tend to idealize Iraq’s 
Shia leaders, either as political quietists, as e.g. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, or as se- 
cularists, as e.g. Ibrahim al-Jafari. Others, however, see Tehran behind any group 
and any perpetrator of hostile acts against Western interests; in that case, they tend 
to hint at Sistani’s Iranian origin and family interests in Qom, and hint at the Iraqi 
oppositions’ long stay in Iran.
As seen from Tehran, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein poses chances and 
challenges: at best, a Tehran friendly govemment will come to power, the Iraqi 
society will be Islamised, the country will stabilise and tensions with the US will 
ease; at worst, the new Iraqi govemment will have to keep distance from Tehran so 
as not to come into view as Iranian stooges, the security situation will further dete- 
riorate and tensions with the US will grow. Although many in Tehran consider US 
losses in Iraq not without a certain satisfaction, they on the other hand fear that 
instability in Iraq will affect Iran’s border provinces and inflame dormant ethnic 
and sectarian strife in their own country. Iran, not unlike any other country in the 
region, strictly objects against the partition of Iraq and Kurdish independence. As 
for now, Tehran can claim to be in an advantageous position sińce the victory of 
the Shia-dominated “United Iraqi Alliance” was indeed disappointing for the US 
and encouraging for the mollahs: at least three of the main parties (PUK, SCIRI, 
Dawa) are close to Tehran, and one of them, SCIRI has intense relations with the 
political and military power of the Iranian theocracy. At the same time, Tehran has
all reasons to avoid too provocative behaviour towards the US; moreover, Iran has 
grudgingly accepted that the US will not leave Iraq -  lest the Gulf region -  soon. 
Both, the US and Iran will continue to pursue their interests in Iraq and neither will 
be able to impose its will upon the Iraąis. Iran however is in an advantageous posi- 
tion thanks to its geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and the fact, that it has 
over the years hosted important Iraąi political parities. But this influence does not 
mean that Tehran could control the Shia of Iraq, as many tend to believe.
The Shia of Iraq
Iraq’s Shias are not a homogeneous group. Most of them are Arabs but there are 
also significant numbers of Faili Kurds, Turkmens, Persians and other nationalities. 
Among the Arabs, tribal and local affiliations still play an important role. For histo­
rie reasons the Shia denomination prevailed among the lower classes, as for exam- 
ple peasants and marsh dwellers, most of whom left for the slums of major cities. 
This does not mean that there have been no Shias in other strata of the society1. 
Iraq’s Shias did not form a unified monolithic bloc and neither they were isolated 
from the rest of the society: Sunni-Shia intermarriage in the Baghdad region for 
instance is rather rule than exception, and for the more secular layers of the Iraqi 
society a person’s belonging to a peculiar denomination hardly played any role at 
all. The concept of a tripartite Iraq, i.e. Sunni, Shia and Kurds is therefore deeply 
flawed, for either one categorises the Iraqi people in religious terms -  Shia and 
Sunna, or in ethnic terms -  Kurds and Arabs, or -w hy not by using the terminology 
of classes. The latter approach might even have been a more useful one. Iraq would 
not have been divided into three big chunks of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds but into 
economically powerful mafia-like family enterprises with political outlets (parties 
or movements) and growing disappointment with this situation expressed through 
inereasing Islamisation. If one decided to approach Iraq this way, it would be easier 
to understand, for instance, the movement of Moqtada al-Sadr. Nevertheless, the 
Islamisation of the Iraqi society in the last years of Saddam Hussein’s rule and the 
distrust of the dominating Tikriti clans against the Shia majority, contributed to 
a more assertive Shia consciousness. At the same time, one should bear in mind, 
that Iraqi Shia political groups are in many cases organisationally linked to other 
Arab countries and they are more deeply immersed in Islamist intemationalism 
than the Iranians, where the Shia confession is integrated in Iranian nationalism2. 
But this consciousness has in no way been contradictory to Iraqi nationalism or 
patriotism as one could see during the long war against Iran: Iranians are aware of 
this and are trying to keep a Iow profile, or at least not to overplay their card of 
confessional brotherhood.
1 See the analysis by H. B a tta tu , The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f  Iraą, 
Princeton 1978/London 2004, pp. 44f.
2 F. A b d  a l-J a b a r , The Shia Movement in Iraą, London 2003, pp. 235, 237.
Main Shia Islamist Parties of Iraq
Iraq has given birth to several political Shia-Islamist movements in reaction against 
communism and atheism of the 1960s and against the Baath socialist-nationalist 
dictatorship of the 1970s. The Iran-Iraq war increasingly detached exile groups 
from inner affairs of Iraq, making them more dependent on Tehran. Only some 
cells of the Dawa party and other, minuscule political groups have survived in Iraq 
sińce before 1980. When Saddam fell, only two genuine and influential Iraqi Shia 
organisational structures have survived: the Marja’iyyah (i.e. the traditional clergy) 
headed by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and the originally clandestine Movement of 
Sadr Thani, lead by Moqtada al-Sadr. Politically, Shia unity depends nowadays on 
the degree to which Sistani and Moqtada are capable of cooperation. Other Shia 
parties, Islamist and secularist alike, are of lesser importance, though they provide 
mainly experienced brainpower and functioning party structures. The most impor- 
tant are the Dawa-Party and SCIRI: both with ties to Iran.
“The Party of the Islamie Cali -  Dawa” (Hizb D a’wa al-Islamiyya) is the ol- 
dest Iraqi Shia Islamist party; in the 1980s and 1990s it split into various branches 
sińce several influential members disagreed with the Iranians on theological and 
political issues3. Parts of the Dawa have been pressed by Tehran to join SCIRI, yet 
most branches have resisted. Its branches in Lebanon and Kuwait were involved in 
terrorist activities against Saddam’s regime throughout the 1980s. During the 
1990s some branches in Western Europę embraced more democratic views, but the 
party remains Islamist and its prominent members as e.g. al-Jafari insist on Islam 
playing a major role in public life. The exile organisation does not yet seem united 
with the remnants of the Iraqi Dawa, at least they were running as a separate for- 
mation in the United Iraqi Alliance.
“The Supreme Council for the Islamie Revolution in Iraq -  SCIRI” (Al- 
Majlis al-A 'la li-th-thawrałi l-islamiyya fi- l- ‘Ira q f  has sińce the beginning been an 
Iranian project and should have functioned as a front organisation for many Isla- 
mist groups, including Sunnis5. Among them the Iraqi-Kurdish Hizbullah, run by 
Muhammad Khalid Barzani, the cousin of Kurdistan Democratic Party leader 
Mas’ud Barzani and leader of the Barzani’s influential Naqshibandi order of De- 
rvishes6. But in the end, SCIRI became a solely Shia endeavour dominated by the 
influential Iraqi al-Hakim family. SCIRI has access to the very core of Iran’s poli­
tical power. Two members of SCIRI’s leadership council -  Ali al-Taskhiri and 
Mahmud al-Hashimi al-Shahroudi -  serve in the Islamie Republic of Iran’s Supre­
me leaders’ office; the Iraqi refugee Shahroudi has even been appointed by Kha-
3 R. Ś h a n ah an , The Islamie D a‘wa Party: Past Development and Futurę Prospects, „Middle East 
Review of International Affairs”, 8/2 June 2004, pp. 16-25; for the ramifications o f the Dawa splinter groups see: 
Jabar (2003), pp. 257f.
4 Literature provides also the acronym SAIR1 standing for Supreme Assembly for the Islamie Revolution 
in Iraq. However, the proper acronym is SCIRI. See the party’s homepage: http://www.sciri.btintemet.co.uk..
5 F. A bd a l-J a b a r  (2003), pp. 235-255.
6 W. P o sch , Irak unter Saddam Hussein. Das Ende einer Ara? Historischer Hintergrund, Akteure, Sze- 
narien, (Studien und Berichte 13) Yienna 2002, p. 156.
menei to the post of Iranian justice minister. And SCIRI’s military wing, the Fay- 
laq Badr (Badr Brigade), was trained, eąuipped, and staffed by the Iranian Pasda- 
ran, the Revolutionary Guards.
Of more limited importance are the “Organisation of Islamie Action -  MAI” 
(Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami), which is a political body representing the clerical 
families of the Modarresi and Shirazis, who over years have opposed Khomeini; 
and the Iraqi Hizbullah. This group led by Abdalkarim Abu 1-Hatim al- 
Muhammadawi has been the last remaining resistance movement in South Iraqi 
marshes. Another home-grown organisation is Fadhilah/V\rtue, a party based in 
Basra, where it imposed strict Islamie laws on the population. The party was foun- 
ded by Muhammad Ya’qubi of Najaf, a follower of Moqtada’s father, who fell off 
with Moqtada and insisted that he was the chosen successor of Muhammad Sadiq 
Sadr.
Finally, one has to comment on the United Iraąi Alliance (ULA. list 169). It is 
not as much a political party as a loose framework unifying secular and Islamist 
Shia parties under the lead of the Dawa and the SCIRI, created for the purpose of 
the elections of January 2005. The list is often referred to as the Sistani list, even 
though Sistani himself is trying to keep his impartiality and does not qualify for 
voting, as he has no Iraqi citizenship. Long-time opposition leader, Ahmad Chala- 
bi, was the mastermind in forging the alliance between the parties involved, inclu- 
ding clerical firebrand Moqtada al-Sadr7 who declines to vote in any elections as 
long as the occupation continues8 but who did not object to his followers casting 
their ballots and forming their own list. As of 23rd February 20059 the allocation of 
seats to the Shia Islamists inside the UIA was as follows: 18 seats to SCIRI; 15 
seats to Islamie Dawa Party; 9 seats to the Islamie Dawa Party-Iraq organisation; 9 
seats to the Islamie Virtue Party; 13 seats to the Shia Islamie Council; 4 seats to the 
Faili Kurds; and 21 seats to Al-Sadr's Current. This means that the ULA holds 89 of 
the total of 140 seats. This does not make them the dominant majority, but they are 
a very powerful błock capable of dominating Iraq’s National Assembly if they keep 
the ULA together and are capable of forging a coalition. As one can clearly see, the 
main questions are whether all these groups can hołd together, and whether their 
political aims will remain focused on certain core issues, as e.g. the constitution. 
Most likely, there may arise a rift between the groups or inside the parties between 
radicals and pragmatists: a fact parties are aware of. Here is where Sistani comes 
in: as arbiter and moderator who alleviates dissents and tries to find compromise. 
But the mortar, which in the end will hołd together the ULA -  in cooperation with 
Sistani -  will be the pragmatists in the Dawa and SCIRI as well as Ahmad Chalabi. 
In case of success, the ULA would be in the unique position to comprise three diffe- 
rent political currents of Shia Islamism: the Iraqi one -  the Dawa-Iraq, and two 
exiled ones: the pro-westem with Jafari and Ahmad Chalabi, and the pro-Iranian
7 B. B u li, The coming o fSh ia  Iraą, „Prospect”, November 2004, pp. 38-45.
8 M. ‘A rsh i, M. Sadr, Ta zainani ke eshglialgaran dar 'Eraą hastand vared-e siyasat nemi shawani/1 
will not jo in  politics as long as the occupiers are in Iraą, „Aftab-e Yazd”, 4 Esfand 1383/22 February 2005, 
(www.aftabyazd.com).
9 Numbers o f Al-Hayat as reported by Juan Cole see: www.juancole.com as o f 23rd February 2005.
(SCIRI) one. In other words, UIA could use well-established contacts with the two 
most serious adversaries in the region, the USA and Iran, both of whom are -  for 
different reasons -  uncomfortable with the unpredictable power of Mashhad-bom 
Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hussaini Sistani, who is one of if not the most impor- 
tant religious leader of the Shia worldwide.
The Shia Clergy
One of the major differences between Shia and Sunni Islam is the fact that Shias 
know an equivalent of the clergy, whereas Sunni Islam is a state-run affair. Sistani 
is one of approximately two dozen Grand Ayatollahs and the head of the respected 
Hawza Ilmiya in Najaf: a theological body of Shia leaming. The prestigious shrine 
of Imam Ali in Najaf apparently belongs to his jurisdiction. Thanks to his being 
a marja’-e taąlid, a “source of emulation”, many pious Shias from all over the 
world follow his rules and regulations (fatwas) and pay him a certain tax (khums). 
An administrative apparatus of representatives (called jihaz) supports the marja’. 
The system that decides when and how one could become a marja’ is not really 
fixed but public acclamation, the number of theology students, recognition by peers 
and, to a lesser degree, by the political authority play an important role10. The ru- 
lings of a marja’ are binding for those who emulate him, whether it is about fa- 
sting, dworce, participation in elections or homeland defence (jihad). The authority 
and institution of the marja’ al-taąlid is the marja’iyyah. When Sistani insists on 
the authority of the marja’iyyah, he seems in most cases to mean the five Grand 
Ayatollahs of Najaf, of whom he is the most revered one. In generał, the marja’s 
have abstained from politics and prefer to play the role of higher spiritual instances. 
Many observers drew the wrong conclusion from the marja’s apparent reluctance 
in engaging in politics. It is to be noted that, as religious authorities, they even da- 
red to challenge Saddam Hussein on matters of morał and Islam in the society11. 
Yet, the Baath regime constrained the activities of the clergy and brutalized them 
after the 1991 intifadha. Najaf conseąuently ceased ground against the theological 
centres of Qom in Iran.
Although religious authority is not hereditary, many families have for gene- 
rations monopolised certain posts of the clerical hierarchy. The most important of 
these families are the Khalisi, the Hakim, the Sadr, the Kashif al-Ghita, the Bahra- 
luloum, the Kubba (Iraqi Arabs) as well as the Modarresi, the Shirazi, the Khoei, 
the Haeri (Iranian and mixed Iranian-Iraqi). Most of them have family members in 
influential positions in the economy and politics. Typical examples include Ay­
atollah Bahraluloum, whose son used to be Iraqi oil minister as well as the fact that
10 Cf.: A. W. T e r r il, Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the fu turę o f th e  U.S. Presence in Post-Saddam  
Iraą, „Strategie Studies Institute”, July 2003, p. 22; L. A l-R a c h id , Du Bon Usage du Chiisme Irakien, „Politique 
Internationale” 2003, no. 101, pp. 95-111 and W. B u ch ta , Who rules Iran? The Structure o f  Power in the Islamie 
Republic, Washington 2000, p. 54.
11 See the analysis o fF . A bd  a l-J a b a r , The Genesis and Development o f  Marjaism against the State, 
Jabar (2002), p. 61-85.
some families have monopolised entire political parties or movements (Modarresi, 
Hakim, Sadr).
The mar j a ’s have at their disposal vast fmancial resources. Taxes and dona- 
tions they receive are invested in foundations, and the revenues gained are re- 
invested in charities that support students and conduct similar activities. The most 
important foundations are the London-based Al-Khoei foundation, named after 
Sistani’s teacher, al-Khoei, and directed by members of the al-Khoei family12, yet, 
there are numerous others under the control of prominent and famous clerical 
families, as e.g. the Shirazi, the Modarresi and the Bahraluloums. Sistani has also 
a say in the prosperous al-Khoei and Aalulbayt foundations. Moreover, a plethora 
of well-established foundations, research institutes and technology centres, hospi- 
tals, and libraries in London, Damascus, Qom, Mashhad, Tehran, and Pakistan are 
more directly related to him13. Statistics on the money he retrieves from his follow- 
ers are generally not available, but in December 2003 Sistani’s representative in 
Qom (Iran) reportedly sent him donations of USD 3.5 million from his followers in 
Iran14. Judging from Sistani’s popularity among the faithful Shia and his worldwide 
activities, the total amount must be remarkable.
Theologians trained in Najaf and Kerbala play an important political role in 
Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf states, and Iran. Most clerical members of Iran’s political 
elite, for example, have spent some time studying in Iraq where they made contacts 
with Iraqi and Lebanese scholars and politicians. Political support for Shia Islamist 
groups was therefore only natural, once they came to power in Iran. Tehran hopes 
that these contacts will now pay off and strengthen its position in Iraq and beyond.
Najaf was also a center where modem Arabie political thought like Pan- 
Arabism, the Palestinian cause, Seyyid Qutb’s jahiliyya-theory, and similar stan- 
dards of modern Islamism were discussed and compared with Shia theology. For 
historie reasons, the Persian influence was strongest among the clergy in the holy 
cities of Najaf, Karbala, Samarra and Kazimain. The bond between the Shia clergy 
in Iran and Iraq is still very strong and intermarriages are so common that in many 
cases it is difficult to tell whether the offspring is Persian or Arab; Iranians and 
other non-Arabs continue to play a dominant role among the higher echelons of the 
Shia clergy until this day. The five Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf are: Mirza Ali Hus- 
saini Sistani from Iran, Muhammad Ishaq Fayyadh of Pakistan, the Afghan Hus- 
sein Bashir Najafi (or al-Afghani), and Muhammad Sa’id al-Hakim, who hails 
from the famous Iraqi al-Hakim dynasty15.
12 www.alkhoeifoundation.com.
13 See: www.sistani.org,www.seestani.com,www.najaf.org, and www.aalulbayt.org.
14 B. D a rg a h i, Al-Sistanim ixes tradition with modern outlook, „Washington Times”, 9 March 2004.
15 Cf. W. P o sc h , Die irakischen Schiiten nach dem Fali Saddam Husseins, [in:] W. F e ic h tin g e r  (ed ), 
Irak 2003, Aspekte eines Umbruchs, Yienna LVAk 2003, pp. 101-154, see: p. 117.
Squabbles over Priority
Sistani is said to be the most important of all Grand Ayatollahs. He follows the 
political quietist school of Grand Ayatollah Abu 1-Qasim al-Khoei (d. 1992), who 
himself succeeded Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1972, father of the SCIRI leaders Mu- 
hammad Baqir and Abdulaziz), who was preceded by Borujerdi (d. 1961, the tea- 
cher of Khomeini). Borujerdi was the last unanimously accepted primus inter pares 
of all Grand Ayatollahs -  or marja’ taąlid mutlaą. The lim  of traditional marja’s 
running from Borujerdi via Hakim and Khoei to Sistani is the Iraqi or Najaf Scho­
ol16, which rejects political activity of the clergy. Khomeini’s Iranian school17 is in 
opposition to the Najaf tradition. Khomeini, who was himself a Grand Ayatollah 
and marja ’ taąlid attempted to unitę the spiritual with the political power. His the- 
ory of the “guardianship of the jurisprudent” {yelayat-e faąih) was rejected -  or 
ignored -  by the clerical establishment of Najaf, who were then under the leaders- 
hip of Al-Khoei, Sistani’s teacher18. Until this day, almost all of the approximately 
twenty Grand Ayatollahs reject the Iranian system, while a semi-clandestine 
“Organisation for the Defence of the Right of the marja has been founded in Lon­
don19.
The relations with Iran
After the revolution, Khomeini and his followers introduced the velayat-e faqih  in 
Iran. Today, his successor, Seyyed Ali Hussaini Khamenei, holds the post of velay- 
at-e faqih and “Supreme Leader of the Islamie Revolution -  Rahbar” (rahbar-t 
enqelab-c eslami). This function means that control of, among other things, the 
Armed forces, security and intelligence apparatus, and judicial bodies. As long as 
Khomeini was alive, this concept was to a certain degree credible in theological 
terms, thanks to Khomeini’s personal charisma and high theological rank. His suc­
cessor, Khamenei, though claims to be the leader of all Shias worldwide and hi- 
ghest marja’, found it a problem to be recognised by other Grand Ayatollahs. In 
effect, they never accepted Khamenei as an equal, lest as their leader, and many 
doubt whether he would ever be a fuli Ayatollah20. The disagreement about who 
would be the highest spiritual leader of the Shias was of minor importance as long 
as Saddam Hussein controlled Najaf and the Iran-based Grand Ayatollahs were 
silenced by Tehran. Nevertheless, the existence of a functioning and powerful Na- 
jafi-based clerical hierarchy without constraint is a serious challenge to the Iranian 
system. It is more the case when some of these eleries wield considerable influence 
in Iran itself, as it is with Sistani, who rejects the system of the “guardianship of the
16 J. A l-Q a z w in i,  The School o f  Najaf, [in:] F. A bd a l-J a b e r  (ed), Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. 
State, religion and social Movements in Iraq, London 2002, pp. 245-264.
17 J. A l-Q a z w in i,  The School o f  Qom, [in:] Jaber (2002), pp. 265-282.
18 Both Khoei and Sistani reportedly disliked Khomeini personally.
19 See: B u ch ta  (2000) p. 48; London hosts many Sistani-friendly foundations and organisations.
20 Ibidem, p. 48, 52f., passim.
jurisprudent”. If Sistani were to be openly declared marja’ taąlid. mutlaą, the loss 
of prestige of Khamenei would aggravate and be a serious blow to the regime’s 
reputation and even legitimacy21. For this reason, Khamenei has to remain involved 
in Iraqi affairs, and sińce he oversees Iran’s armed forces, security services and 
judicial bodies, the question of clerical rank and hierarchy between Najaf and Teh­
ran includes a serious security aspect.
The delivery of Najaf from Baathist constrains seemingly weakened Teh­
ran^ position even among those groups who accept the Iranian system. A trend 
towards splitting the Shia clergy’s responsibility between Persians and Arabs has 
already emerged and some pro-Tehran groups ask why the same person (Khame­
nei) should be responsible for the Muslims of Iran and of Arab countries22. Their 
most vociferous voice is the Najaf-born Lebanese Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 
Hussein Fadhlallah, who sińce the mid-1990s has openly criticised the dominant 
role played by Iran23. If this trend continues, Tehran’s influence will remain only 
with Hizbullah, and without any chance to see Khamenei recognised as the head of 
the Shia elsewhere. Yet, it appears that Sistani and Khamenei carefully avoid any 
disagreement or at least do not let it surface; neither do they have any interest to 
start an open discussion on the legitimacy of the Iranian theocracy. They are rather 
interested to prolong the status quo, i.e. the Iranian system coexisting with Najaf. 
As long as the situation continues this way, Sistani will not challenge Khamenei, 
who treats Sistani with respect and politeness24. In matters of protocol, one refers to 
Khamenei as “Supreme Leader of the Islamie Revolution” or the Supreme Leader 
in short. This title is more a reflection of his function as the head of Iran’s power 
elite than of his standing among the Shias worldwide. On the other hand, it must 
not be forgotten that Khamenei has the power to seize all assets of Sistani’s foun­
dations and may harass his relatives, who reportedly fear the Iranian authorities, in 
Iran.25 However, in the long run, Sistani will prevail and Khamenei’s role will be 
more and more confmed to its political function as head of the Iranian State appa- 
ratus.
Generation X
Sistani represents the elder, more traditionally-minded generation that lived in Iraq 
and survived Saddam Hussein’s onslaughts unlike many other prominent Islamie 
thinkers and theoreticians who were systematically killed or expelled by the Baath 
regime. He too, like the Shiite politicians who have recently retumed from their 
exile, fosters rather moderate political views. However, the movement of Moqtada
21 P o sc h  (2003), p. 141.
22 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, „Iraq Report”, 6.31, 17th July 2003.
23 R. S c h a e r y -E is e n lo h r , Iran the Vatican o f  S h i’ism?, „Middle East Report”, 223/2004, pp. 40-43; 
one may also add (Grand?) Ayatollahs Shirazi and Modarresi.
24 See www.khamenei.ir/EN/Message/detail.jsp?id=20040811 A: Khamenei refers to Sistani and to him- 
self simply with the technical term “ayatollah”.
25 B. D a ra g a h i, Al-Sistani mixes tradition with modern outlook, „Washington Times”, 9th March 2004.
al-Sadr challenges this relatively moderate trend in Iraqi Shia politics. The trend of 
radical Shiism emerged unbeknown to most observers in the 1990s, when Moqta- 
da’s father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Sadr (or Sadr Than i.e. the se­
cond)26 became popular among the disenfranchised masses of Shias in Sadr (then 
Saddam) City and the Marsh Arabs during the sanctions regime against Iraq. The 
Iraqi Regime tried to bolster Muhammad Sadiq’s status in order to have an Arab 
“source of emulation” as opposed to the Persian Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Sadiq 
Sadr, who hailed from a very famous Iraqi Arab clerical family, attracted his fol- 
lowers partially though his own system of food-distribution to the poor, and par- 
tially by his unique combination of Islamic-Sharia law and tribal customs. After his 
assassination in 1999, his only surviving son, Moqtada al-Sadr, went into hiding 
only to re-appear after the US-led invasion. The existence of this extended network 
came to Western and Iranian observers as a surprise.
Moreover, Moqtada’s movement was extremely successful and challenged 
ex-Baathis, the clerical establishment in Najaf, Iran and the USA alike. It consists 
of three components: the core clerical group, Moqtada’s father’s charity network, 
and spontaneous mobs27. The last have by now been transformed into the Mahdi 
Army -  Moqtada’s ramshackle militia. The importance of this movement lies in the 
fact that it shares social base and populist approach with some other radical Isla- 
mist movements of the region that emerged in the 1990s. His followers, as e.g. the 
young combatants of the Taliban, the GIA or other radical groups, owe little to the 
refined political and theological discourse of the elder generation but share the 
experience of war and oppression. They are by and large young, urbanised, disen­
franchised, disillusioned and detached from the traditional clerical hierarchy. They 
are Iraq’s Shia version of an “Islamist Generation X”, which knows that their aspi- 
rations for upward mobility will not materialise in the nearest futurę, which are 
highly politicised and more open to radical solutions of any kind28.
Their main feature is a relative lack of Islamie education -  Moqtada is a li- 
ghtweight in Islamie theology and scholarship as in political thought. Moqtada 
offers neither a concise political system, nor a definition of what Iraq should look 
like; given the case he would get things run along the lines of his preference. He is, 
therefore, not to be compared with Khomeini who had a precise ideological vision 
and the political saw y to out-manoeuvre his opponents, but rather with the Tali­
ban29. Like them, Moqtada improvises somewhere between his understanding of 
Sharia and nationalism, as the citizens of Najaf could observe, when his men took 
over the town for a number of weeks. Since the disenfranchised followers of Moq- 
tada al-Sadr are the result of the generał “de-culturisation” of Iraq’s society, co-
26 His brother, Muhammad Baqir Sadr, is Sadr I. He was one of the most respected Shia theologians and political 
theorists. Saddam Hussein’s henchmen murderedhim in 1980.
27 Jabar (2003), p. 26.
28 Jenny White first used the term “Islamist Generation X” in her study o f Turkish Islamism and vema- 
cular politics. By this, she meant (a) the young, urban generation who (b) have loosened if not lost their ties to the 
traditional Islamie institution (in their case: patrons and brotherhoods), but are (c) religiously educated and (d) live 
in dire economic circumstances with no chance for amelioration of their economic situation. See: J. B. W hite, 
Islamist Mobilisation in Turkey. A Study in Vernacular Politics, Washington D.C. 2002, p. 132.
29 B u li, p. 39.
produced by a decade of economic sanctions and Saddam Hussein’s crony-based 
dictatorship, they are nevertheless a genuine, nativist Iraqi political power, to be 
reckoned with30.
Sistani’s Politics
The fact that Sistani does not support the Iranian system of velayat-e faqih  made 
many observers mistakenly perceive him as apolitical or a kind of secularist31, ne­
ither of which is true. Sistani, whose political vision includes Islamie and demo- 
cratic tenets, denies the higher clergy the right to run the govemment, though he is 
elear about pushing the society in a more Islamie direction. He wants the 
marja’iyyah to stay aloof of politics, transcending party politics, and giving the 
direction matters more than aspiring political power that could only destroy his 
morał credit, as it happened with the eleries in Iran. Sistani’s fatwas and political 
statements directed and formulated the political claims of Iraq’s Shia. Recurring 
topics are the sovereignty of Iraq, democracy, and Islamie values. Although most 
Western observers will not be enthusiastic about the Islamie direction Sistani heads 
for, he must be credited for his peaceful methods and, unlike Khomeini’s follo- 
wers, not encouraging the use of violence against political competitors. Sistani, in 
our view made two points elear; first: that he will remain in the political game for 
the foreseeable futurę, and second: that, if not equal to Sistani, Moqtada is at least 
the ‘number two’ in Iraq’s Shia movement.
Step I: Setting the Stage and restoring the Marja’iyyah’s authority
Sistani did certainly not step into politics voluntarily; he was forced to do so by the 
chaotic circumstances in the aftermath of the US-led invasion. Sistani issued im- 
mediately fatw asn  in order to interdict looting, random killings of Baath members 
and any acts of anarchy. He was helped by the organisational structures that Sad­
dam Hussein could not entirely destroy -  the marja’iyyah's networks of mosques 
and other institutions. Furthermore, Sistani encouraged the spontaneous constitu- 
tion of neighbourhood committees to facilitate distribution of aid and to provide 
rudimentary security structures33. These committees served also as bases for Isla- 
misation of the daily life, as e.g. the interdiction of alcohol consumption and obli- 
gation to wear Islamie garments for the women. The spontaneous organisation was 
so efficient that it was able to structure the masses of pilgrims, who flooded Najaf
30 Cf. Jabar (2003), p. 25f.
31 E. S c h m itt , U.S. Officials Say a Theocratic Iraą Is Unlikely, „New York Times”, 7 February 2005.
32 The first point o f his fa tw a  is elear enough: “Reject any foreign rule in Iraq”, see: www.sistani.org/mes- 
sages/eng/ir2.htm.
The introduction of his fa tw a  reads: “to fili the current vacuum with suitable and devout people. To co- 
operate in restoring law and order by establishing.councils for each province [...]  and district whereby well-known 
spiritual figures and committed older members o f the community, heads of tribes and others can assist in organi- 
zing the affaires o f the country and restore law and order to each area.”
and Karbala at Ashura in 200334. In the few weeks immediately following the fali 
of Saddam, Shia groups managed to create structures that replaced those of the 
once omnipresent Baath party. In the end, an Iraqi Shia civil society came into 
existence with Sistani being its rallying force. What has to be made elear, is the 
fact that this is a very Islamie and from its definition anti-occupation minded civil 
society35. Sistani was able to prove his morał power and amidst the ongoing chaos 
in Iraq his voice sounded reasonable, and was therefore increasingly heard, also by 
Western observers. In the end, the Shia political setting of Iraq was defined, local 
groups and parties exerted power in their respective domains, and Sistani reassured 
the authority of the M arja’iyyah. By June 2004, he felt so confident as to advice to 
the United Nations “kindly [to] convey the position of the Religious Mar­
ja  ’iyyah”36. Newcomers to Iraq had to fit into this new political environment and to 
reckon with the M arja’iyyah’s inereasing political influence. Among them were the 
occupation forces and exiled political parties, or in other words: the USA and Iran.
Step II: Spreading the Message of Sovereignty, Democracy and Islam
It took the US a few months to realize how important Sistani actually was, he faced 
down the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on many occasions, starting with 
the now famous/hfwa of 25th June 2003, when he denied the CPA any authority to 
write a constitution37. He finally reached his goal: the US had to accept the return 
of the personel to Iraq, Sistani’s comments on the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL), and it was him who rejected the inclusion of the TAL in UNSCR 154638. 
Yet, he was never blocking or insisting on unrealistic positions, for instance he 
accepted the fact that the elections to the National Assembly would be held later 
than he originally wanted. Thus the elections of 30th January 2005 were as much 
his success as the US administration’s. Sistani will leave day-to-day politics to the 
politicians of the victorious United Iraqi Alliance, but he will definitely co-author 
Iraq’s futurę constitution and ensure that Sunni voices will be heard too. (Another 
co-author if not the main drafter will be the US.)
State-Islam relations will be among core problems in the drafting of the con­
stitution. It will be interesting to see what language will be used, sińce any wording 
that would bring Iraq close to an “Islamie Republic” (like Pakistan and recently 
Iran) is unacceptable for the US. Nevertheless, the groundwork for the Islamisation 
of Iraq has already been done in the aftermath of the fali of Saddam Hussein, with 
the Shia groups having filled the power vacuum. Was it not obvious from the be- 
ginning that Sistani and his followers had a vision of an Islamie Iraq they will not 
gladly abandon? Islam is therefore to become the source of legislation, as it was
34 P o sch  (2003), pp. 120f.
35 A A rato , The occupation o f  Iraą and the difficult Transition from Dictatorship, „Constellations”
2003, vol. 10/3.
36 www.sistani.org/messages/eng/bay8.htm.
37 See: A. A rato , Sistani v. Bush. Constitutional Politics in Iraq, „Constellations” 2004, vol. 11/2.
38 http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/bay8.htm.
already stated in the finał conclusions of the US-sponsored London conference in 
December 200239: “al-islam masdar al-tashri'/Islam is the source of legislation”. 
Official English translations tried to cover up this fervently Islamist declaration by 
using a wording more satisfying to secular Western ears. After the elections of 30th 
January 2005, the spokesman of the Hawza reiterated that Islam should be made 
the source of legislation in the permanent constitution, while other sources close to 
Sistani wamed officials “against the separation of State and religion”40.
Sistani will have no problem with a secular govemment, provided it does not 
act against Islam, as defined by the Mar ja  ’iyyah. The clerics will not rule in Iraą, 
but they insist on the right to approve laws, and Sistani expects any futurę govem- 
ment to heed his fatwas on social issues. This is very similar to the Iranian consti­
tution of 190641. Both Sistani’s education and spiritual lineage (Khoei, Borujerdi) 
would confirm this assumption. Sistani does not mean to reject democracy as it 
appears to be the second root of his political vision for Iraq. He believes free and 
fair generał elections to result in a pluralistic and representative parliament encom- 
passing ethnic and religious minorities. Yet, one has to ask whether the mar- 
j a ’iyyah and the Shia Islamists simplify the concept of democracy. Majority rule 
and the people as source of power and legislation, bring the same result in both 
cases: Shias will rule, sińce they are the majority, and therefore they will hołd po­
wer. “A corollary to democracy, the Islamists usually overlook,” writes Faleh Abd 
al-Jabar “is pluralism, along with civil and human rights”42. Nevertheless Sistani 
seems to have a genuine interest in democracy and the outcome of the elections 
forces the United Iraqi List to find allies, make compromises, and to cooperate with 
all parties. At the same time, Sistani and many other representatives reach out to 
the Kurds and the Sunnis and declare their willingness to cooperate. As in the case 
of the elections, Sistani’s morał support for the govemment during the drafting of 
the constitution is crucial. Needless to say, the govemment will neither be anti- 
clerical nor will they enact any anti-Islamic legislation.
Step III: Holding the Ground
The apparently apolitical role Sistani envisions for the clergy does not naturally 
concem the question of his (and his fellow grandees’) authority in theological 
terms. This role, however, still allows lower clergymen, let us say -  below of the 
rank of Ayatollah -  to hołd political posts. This applies to Moqtada al-Sadr and 
Abdulaziz Hakim: in both cases Sistani has no means to stop their political activi- 
ties anyway. But conceming Najaf and the Hawza Ilmiyya, Sistani assured that the
39 F. A b d  a l-J a b a r , The Worldly Roots o f  Religiosity in Post-Saddam Iraą, „Middle East Report” 2003, 
227, pp. 12-18: p. 14.
40 Iraą Shia leaders detnand Islam be the source o f  law, „Agence France Press”, www.turkishpress.com 
on 6th February 2005.
41 A. J. R u b in , Ayatollah Sistani to sliape fu turę as Shia bloc win looms, „The Indian Express”, 07th Fe­
bruary 2005.
42 F. A bd  a l-J a b a r , The Shia Movement in Iraą, London 2003, p. 21.
game was played by the rules of the Marja’iyya and not Moqtada’s or Tehran’s. 
Hence, the only real threat to Sistani was Moątada al-Sadr, who, at least for some 
time, cooperative.
It has been said already that neither Najaf nor Tehran have any interest in di- 
sputing religious and political differences conceming the system of the Islamie 
Republic. Tehran or personalities close to Tehran have nevertheless tried to exert 
a greater influence on N ajaf s Hawza seminary that unites the five Iraq-based 
Grand Ayatollahs. The one most likely to succeed was Ayatollah Muhammad 
Baqir al-Hakim, who was welcomed by thousands of followers at his return to Iraq. 
Muhammad Baqir was personally selected by Khomeini to become the leader of 
the Islamie Revolution in Iraq. In due course Hakim accepted the Iranian system of 
the “guardianship of the jurisprudent”. In May 2003 however, Hakim distanced 
himself from the Iranian system and joined the Hawza as a teacher to become a fuli 
marja’ and Grand Ayatollah, handing the leadership of SCIRI over to his younger 
brother Abdulaziz. The gruesome death of Ayatollah al-Hakim in August 2003 
made people forget the significance of this act. Hakim was a close friend and long- 
time follower of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whom in theory he had to emula- 
te. Joining the Najaf School having given up the Iranian system underscores the 
unpopularity of the latter in Iraq. On the other hand, this would be a price worth 
paying for Tehran if the result could bring someone who knows about Iranian poli­
tical sensibilities into the Hawza.
At the same time, Tehran has tried to exert influence on Moqtada al-Sadr. 
Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, for example, declared Moqtada’s fatwas as being 
of the same value as those of any revered Ayatollah. The rationale behind this 
move was twofold: for Tehran to get a hołd on Moqtada, who is only a minor cle- 
ric, for Haeri to win over Moqtada to grasp a certain power base in Iraq and to have 
support for joining the Hawza. However, Haeri and Moqtada lost off and the rela- 
tionship between Najaf-bom Haeri, who seems to be one of the Grand Ayatollahs, 
and the Hawza is not entirely elear43.
Moqtada al-Sadr, as his father before him, openly supports the concept of the 
“rule of the jurisprudent” though it is extremely doubtful that he would accept 
Khamenei as Supreme leader. Given Moqtada’s xenophobic feelings that include 
Iranians as well as all non-Arabs and non-Iraqis, and even Iraqi exiles in generał -  
this would come as a major surprise. Soon after the invasion, Moqtada threatened 
Sistani due to his foreign (i.e. Iranian) origin, and he would certainly have him 
expelled from Iraq, if armed tribesmen would not have come and relieved Sistani. 
At the same time, Moqtada was allegedly involved in the murder of Majid al-Khoei 
in N ajaf s mosque. Moqtada’s followers undertook an attempt to get hołd of the 
mosque’s administration, the sepulchre of Imam Ali, and the mosque’s vast treasu- 
ry. Moqtada’s second attempt to get hołd on this holiest place of Shia Islam was 
perhaps not planned but rather triggered off by Paul Bremer, who closed down 
Moqtada’s newspaper and declared (in a language that resembled Saddam Husse-
43 P o sc h  (2003), p. 144.
in’s). The four-month siege of Najaf during the summer of 2004, when US troops 
finally expelled Moqtada’s ramshackle Mahdi Army, was a total success for -  Si­
stani, who at that time had to undergo medical treatment in London and to return in 
a timely manner in order to sign and seal a deal on cooperation with Moątada44. In 
this case, these were the US troops and not Arab tribesmen that came to restore 
Sistani’s authority in Najaf. The arrest warrant against the cleric firebrand has be- 
come somehow forgotten.
This has so far been the last challenge to Sistani’s authority, however, he is 
well advised not to want more in terms of influence and to hołd the course of an 
apolitical marja’, for in most cases, the faithful accept Sistani’s spiritual and the- 
ological superiority, but for political leadership they look at Moątada45. And Moą­
tada’s followers have repeatedly voiced their dissatisfaction with the behaviour of 
the ayatollahs during the crisis of summer 2004, albeit without mentioning Sistani 
by name46. The framework of Iraq’s Shia has already been defined as set between 
the two poles of M oątada’s low-class radicals of the Generation X on one extre- 
mity, and Sistani’s venerated centuries-old institution of high-rank clerics on the 
other. Sistani will have to maintain his relations with Moątada but he also has to 
take the US and Iran into consideration.
Baghdad, Tehran and Washington: happy together?
One of the more surprising coalitions in the up-run to the Iraą invasion was US- 
SCIRI cooperation. It was facilitated by the Iraą liberation act of 1998 and the mo­
re liberał climate following the election of president Khatami in 1997. It actually 
dates back to the early 1990s, with SCIRI’s contacts to Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraąi 
National Congress. Iran’s revolutionary leader Khamenei must have accepted per- 
sonally SCIRI’s participation in Ahmad Chalabi’s US-sponsored Iraąi National 
Congress as well as the increasing cooperation between SCIRI and the US. In the 
end, SCIRI managed to walk a fine line between the US and the Iranians, carefully 
acting more and more independently from Tehran. A similar development of Shia 
political organisations emancipating themselves form Tehran has already taken 
place in Lebanon, where Iranian NGOs became, over the years, totally Lebanised. 
Tehran’s relations with Grand Ayatollah Fadhlallah47 are another case in point, 
while signs of a polite distancing from Tehran have been recorded even among 
Tehran’s closest allies, the Lebanese Hizbollah48. Tehran is aware of the fact that it 
has now poorer leverage on SCIRI. What they can, nonetheless, count on are per- 
sonal networks and interrelations between Iran’s security apparatus headed by the
44 B u li ,  p. 38.
45 Ibidem , p. 41; This is corroborated by the election’s outcome, Moqtada’s followers gained majority in 
Maysam Province and Sadr city.
46 E. E c k h o lm , A lly o fM ilitan t Cleric is on the Stump in Sadr City, „New York Times”, 5 January 2005.
47 It shall be noticed that Fadhlallah is a follower of Abu 1-Qasim Khoei and therefore an opponent of
Khamenei. ,
48 S h a e r y -E is e n lo h r , p. 43.
Supreme Leader Khamenei and the SCIRI leadership. SCIRI’s intelligence and 
security apparatus as well as the party’s militia, the Badr Brigade, were until re- 
cently run entirely by Iranian security personnel. Members of the Badr militia are 
already volunteering for the Iraqi security forces, at the same time, some talk about 
an integration of the entire Badr brigade into the Iraqi army. In our view, a possible 
take-over of major SCIRI and Badr human resources will result in Iraqisation of 
these organisations rather than in an Iranisation of Iraq’s institutions.
For this reason, this vision is defmitely not the one th i US has for the futurę 
of Iraq’s security apparatus. Here, the US counts on ex-Baathis rather than on radi­
cal Shias49. In July 2003, Ahmad Chalabi, apparently following the guidelines issu- 
ed by the US, approached members of the “Turkey” and “Iran” departments of the 
Mukhabarat50, the notorious security apparatus of the Baath Party51. In the follo­
wing months, Iyad Allawi gained more ex-Baathi officers for the Army and other 
security forces52. Even at the height of the crisis at the standoff in Najaf, the Iraqi 
government preferred to attack Iran for meddling with Iraqi affairs and the SCIRI 
of being directed by Tehran, than Moqtada and his Mahdi Army. Defence minister 
Sha’lan and Mukhabarat director Shahwani have ever sińce increased their nega- 
tive comments on Tehran’s policy53, though if their efforts were to diminish the 
SCIRI’s chances at the elections, they were in vain. Given the current situation in 
Iraq, the US and Iran have to face two realities:
a) any Iraqi army will draw heavily on Shia conscripts and officers, many of them 
from the Faylaq Badr, one of the few organisations that have combat experience. 
Taking into consideration the outcome of the elections, the US will also have to 
recognize a more important role of SCIRI and Dawa staff in the ministries. Yet 
while Iran will not have the leverage on the highest management of either party, 
the Iranians are able to provide materiał and financial aid to the social services of 
the Shia Islamists, thus restoring their image and creating new contacts with the 
Islamie Republic at the grassroots level,
b) on the other hand, everybody will have to accept the fact that US advisers will 
stay in central positions and largely direct Iraq’s foreign and security policy. Fur- 
ther, Iraq’s armed forces are unlikely to become independent of US military and 
contract military personnel in near futurę. The US has also ensured that the national 
security advisor and the head of the national intelligence, both elected by Iyad Al-
49 In this case, I argued elsewhere that Iyad Allawi’s government is a “Baath-light” version. Cf. 
W. P osch , Von der Baath-Herrschaft zur Neo-Baath Regierung, „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte”, 22nd Novem- 
ber 2004, pp. 31-38; for a similar view of the Allawi govemment see: www.juancole.com.
50 I. a l-M a r ’a sh i, lraq 's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis, „Middle East 
Review of International Affairs”, 6.3 September 2002, pp. 1-13: here pp. 5f.
51 N. B e n e r je e  and D. Jeh l, US helps Iraq rebuild units that monitor Iran , „New York Times”, 22. July 
2003; Similar activities were reported from the CIA see N. R o sen , Unsavory Allies stack C IA ’s deck, www.post- 
gazette.com, 24th August 2003.
52 E. W on g and E. E ck h o lm , Allawi Presses to Effort to Bring Back Baatliists, „New York Times”, 
12th October 2004.
53 Cf. Iraqi minister, intelligence ch ie f to be investigated over unwarranted arrest, in: www.chinaview.cn;
21 st September 2004.
lawi, are given five-year terms of office54. That means that key positions in Iraq 
will be held for at least four more years by pro-US officers.
This having been said, it can be ascertained that neither the US nor Iran are 
able to outmanoeuvre one another in the fabric of Iraq’s security structures, not to 
say driving the opponent out of Iraq. Both extemal powers will remain engaged. 
Iraqis, Iranians, and the USA share the same views conceming the unity and terri- 
torial integrity of Iraq and the end of the insurgency. No party is interested in 
a full-fledged civil war that could result in a direct US vs. Iran confrontation with 
unpredictable consequences. In this case, a rapprochement between Iran and the 
USA would be a logical step. Admittedly, Iraq is only a single aspect of the 
US/Iran relations, and will certainly not provide the main reason for the rappro­
chement, even though a certain tacit understanding should be possible. This is even 
more necessary, when one considers the tasks and challenges the Iraqi govemment 
is facing: winning over the Sunnis, assuring Kurdish support, and writing a new 
constitution that would include nothing less than a defmite solution of the Kurdish 
autonomy including the status of Kirkuk and, last but not least, organisation of 
futurę elections scheduled for December 2005.
54 M. R ai, Whoever You Vote for, Washington Wins. How Washington Plans to Dominate the New Iraąi 
National Assembly, „Electronic Iraq”, 16th February 2005: electroniciraq.net.
